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Chapter Appendix E - Endnotes

 Section Chapter Three: Hurricane Katrina — Pre-Landfall

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Chapter Three: Hurricane Katrina — Pre-Landfall

1 The White House, “President Discusses Hurricane Katrina, Congratulates Iraqis on Draft Constitution,” news release, August 28, 2005.

2 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Atlantic Oceanographic and Meteorological Laboratory, Hurricane Research Division, “Frequently Asked Questions,” .  The National Hurricane Center defines “major hurricanes” as hurricanes that reach maximum sustained 1-minute surface winds of at least 111 mph.

3 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “NOAA: 2005 Atlantic Hurricane Season Outlook,” May 16, 2005.  In 2004, the hurricane season had been particularly devastating.  Twenty seven disasters were declared in fifteen States and two U.S. Territories.  The season was especially difficult for Florida, which took a direct hit from four hurricanes and one tropical storm in six weeks.  Together, Hurricanes Charlie, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne, directly or indirectly resulted in over 150 U.S. deaths and approximately forty-six billion dollars in damage.  Richard J. Pasch, Daniel P. Brown, and Eric S. Blake, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Charlie,  prepared for the National Hurricane Center, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (Miami, Florida, October 18, 2004), (updated January 5, 2005); Jack Beven II, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Frances, prepared for National Hurricane Center, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (Miami, Florida, December 17, 2004); Stacy R. Stewart, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Ivan, prepared for the National Hurricane Center, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (Miami, Florida, December 16, 2004), (updated May 27, 2005); Miles B. Lawrence and Hugh D. Cobb, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Jeanne, prepared for the National Hurricane Center, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (Miami, Florida, November 22, 2004), (updated January 7, 2005).

4 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “NOAA Issues 2005 Atlantic Hurricane Season Outlook: Another Above Normal Season Expected,” news release, May 16, 2005.

5 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service, “New Weather Forecast Office in Key West Hoists Hurricane Flags for Wilma,” news release, October 24, 2005: “Hurricane Wilma is part of a hurricane season replete with “firsts”: . . . a record of seven named storms had formed by the end of July.”

6 Jack Beven II, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Dennis, prepared for the National Hurricane Center, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (Miami, Florida, November 22, 2005) (updated December 16, 2005).

7 Monroe County, Key West Florida, “Emergency News Hurricane Dennis,” July 8, 2005, .  Evacuations were ordered in the Florida Keys for “all non-residents” and “all residents west of the Seven Mile Bridge.”  For information on major disaster declarations, see Federal Register. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Alabama; Major Disaster and Related Determinations,” July 10, 2005, ; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Mississippi; Major Disaster and Related Determinations,” July 10, 2005, ; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Florida; Major Disaster and Related Determinations,” July 10, 2005, .  In preparation for Hurricane Dennis, FEMA activated its Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC) in Atlanta at the highest operational level.  FEMA conducted coordination calls between Federal, State and local officials, positioned liaison officers at State Emergency Operations Centers, pre-staged emergency supplies and response teams at various locations, and requested the activation of the First U.S. Army’s crisis action team.  See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “FEMA Regional Center at Highest Level in Preparation for Hurricane Dennis,” news release, July 9, 2005; Department of Defense, First U.S. Army, “First U.S. Army Stands up Crisis Action Team for Hurricane Dennis,” news release, July 9, 2005.  Other military preparations for Hurricane Dennis included the alert of National Guardsmen in Florida, Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana and Georgia.  See U.S. Department of Defense, “Military Taking Precautions as Hurricane Dennis Approaches,” news release, July 8, 2005.

8 State of Louisiana, Office of the Governor, “Governor Blanco Declares State of Emergency Regarding Hurricane Dennis,” news release, July 8, 2005, .

9 Jack Beven II, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Dennis, prepared for the National Hurricane Center, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (Miami, Florida, November 22, 2005), (updated December 16, 2005).

10 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, August 2005 Update to Atlantic Hurricane Season Outlook: Bulk of This Season’s Storms Still to Come (Washington, D.C, August 2, 2005).

11 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “NOAA Raises the 2005 Atlantic Hurricane Season Outlook,” August 2, 2005, .

12 Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel Brown, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Katrina, August 23-30, 2005, prepared for the National Hurricane Center, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (Miami, Florida, December 2005), 1.  Excerpt from this text:  “The complex genesis of Katrina involved the interaction of a tropical wave, the middle tropospheric remnants of Tropical Depression Ten, and an upper tropospheric trough.  This trough, located over the western Atlantic and the Bahamas, produced strong westerly shear across Tropical Depression Ten, causing it to degenerate on 14 August approximately 825 n. mi. east of Barbados.   The low-level circulation gradually weakened while continuing westward, and it eventually dissipated on 21 August in the vicinity of Cuba.  Meanwhile, a middle tropospheric circulation originating from Tropical Depression Ten lagged behind and passed north of the Leeward Islands on 18-19 August.  A tropical wave moved through the Leeward Islands and merged with the middle tropospheric remnants of Tropical Depression Ten on 19 August, forming a large area of showers and thunderstorms north of Puerto Rico.  This activity continued to move slowly northwestward, passing north of Hispaniola and then consolidating just east of the Turks and Caicos during the afternoon of 22 August.  Dvorak satellite classifications from the Tropical Analysis and Forecast Branch (TAFB) of the Tropical Prediction Center (TPC) began at 1800 utc that day.  The upper tropospheric trough weakened as it moved westward toward Florida, and the shear relaxed enough to allow the system to develop into a tropical depression by 1800 utc 23 August over the southeastern Bahamas about 175 n. mi. southeast of Nassau.  The depression was designated Tropical Depression Twelve rather than “Ten” because a separate tropical wave appeared to be partially responsible for the cyclogenesis, and, more importantly, the low-level circulation of Tropical Depression Ten was clearly not involved.”

13 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Katrina Advisory #1 (Miami, Florida, August 23, 2005).  National Hurricane Center Katrina Advisories were released every several hours beginning at 5:00 pm edt on August 23 and ending at 10:00 am cdt on August 30.  Advisories were typically issued at 5:00 am, 11:00 am, 5:00 pm, and 11:00 pm edt each day.  The advisories are numbered sequentially from 1 to 31.  Most of the advisories were updated with supplemental advisories—for example, Hurricane Katrina Advisory 1 was released at 5:00 pm edt and Advisory 1a was released at 8:00 pm edt.  Advisory 2 was released at 11:00 pm edt.  The official publication time zone switched from Eastern Daylight Time to Central Daylight Time with Advisory #17, released at 10:00 am cdt, August 27, 2005.  All Hurricane Katrina Advisories are available from the National Hurricane Center.  See U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Hurricane Center, “Hurricane Katrina Advisory Archive,” .

14 Admiral Timothy J. Keating, Commander North American Aerospace Defense Command and U.S. Northern Command, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the Department of Defense, the Coast Guard, and the National Guard of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, on October 27, 2005, submitted to the House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session.

15 “Based on aircraft reconnaissance flight-level wind data, the cyclone became Katrina, the 11th tropical storm of the 2005 Atlantic hurricane season, at 1200 utc 24 August when it was centered over the central Bahamas about 65 n. mi. east-southeast of Nassau.”  Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel Brown, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Katrina, August 23-30, 2005, prepared for the National Hurricane Center, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (Miami, Florida, December 20, 2005), 1.

16 FEMA’s Hurricane Liaison Team became operational at 7:00 am edt on August 24, 2005.  The HLT had begun monitoring the storm the previous evening.  FEMA Tropical Storm Katrina Briefing, August 25, 2005.

17 U.S. Department of Defense, OASD HD, Hurricane Katrina/Rita/Ophelia Interim Timeline (Aug. – Sept. 2005), November 2, 2005, 2.

18 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Hurricane Center, Tropical Storm Katrina Advisory 4 (Washington, D.C., August 24, 2005).

19 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service Tropical Prediction Center and National Hurricane Center, “Hurricane Katrina Discussion Number 9,” August 25, 2005; U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service Tropical Prediction Center and National Hurricane Center, “Tropical Storm Katrina Discussion Number 8,” August 25, 2005.

20 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service, Miami-South Florida Forecast Office, “Hurricane Katrina Storm Report,” September 1, 2005, .

21 Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel P. Brown, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Katrina, 23-30 August 2005, prepared for the National Hurricane Center (Miami, Florida, August 2005), 10.

22 Florida Power & Light, Company, “FPL begins assessment process following Hurricane Katrina,” news release, August 26, 2005, .

23 National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Remote Sensing Tutorial, “Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma,” .

24 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service, Miami-South Florida Forecast Office, “Hurricane Katrina Storm Report,” September 1, 2005, ; and Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, “Bronson to Assess Hurricane Katrina Damage to South Florida Agriculture,” news release, August 29, 2005, .

25 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP # 1,” August 25, 2005.  The Emergency Operations Center is the physical location at which the coordination of information and resources to support domestic incident management activities normally takes place.  An EOC may be a temporary facility or may be located in a more central or permanently established facility. See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, D.C., December 2004), 64.

26 Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #1, August 25, 2005.

27 “Despite all of our efforts and despite the fact that we pre-positioned more commodities and staged more rescue and medical teams than ever before in our agency's history, our initial response was overwhelmed.”  William Lokey, Federal Coordinating Officer, Baton Rouge, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina Response in Louisiana, on December 14, 2005, submitted to the House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session.

28 On August 25, FEMA began to identify ERT-A teams for deployment to Florida and Alabama.  FEMA Tropical Storm Katrina Briefing, August 25, 2005.  For definition of ERT-A, see U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Glossary,” .

29 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “National Situation Update,” August 26, 2005, .  Throughout this Report, note that events were occurring in different time zones.  Times referenced as Central Daylight Time (cdt) reflect the local time events took place in Louisiana.  All Noon FEMA video teleconferences took place at 12:00 pm Eastern Daylight Time (edt), which was 11:00 am in Louisiana and Mississippi.  Throughout the report, times are referenced in accordance with the source material supporting the text.

30 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Katrina Advisory #11 (Washington, D.C., August 26, 2005).

31 Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel Brown, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Katrina (23-30 August 2005), prepared for the National Hurricane Center, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (Miami, Florida, December 2005), 2-3.

32 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Katrina Intermediate Advisory # 14 (Miami, Florida, August 26, 2005); U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “National Situation Update,” August 26, 2005.

33 See National Weather Service Tropical Prediction Center and National Hurricane Center Hurricane Katrina Advisories 15 through 26, covering a period from August 26, 2005, 11:00 pm edt to August 29, 2005, 6:00 am cdt.  These advisories are available at the U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service Tropical Prediction Center and National Hurricane Center, “Hurricane Katrina Advisory Archive,” .

34 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Hurricane Center, “Hurricane Katrina Forecast Timeline,” n.d., ca. 2005.

35 Brigadier General David L. Johnson (USAF, Ret.), Director of the National Weather Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, written statement for a hearing on NOAA Hurricane Forecasting, on October 7, 2005, submitted to the House Committee on Science, 109th Congress, 1st session, 2.

36 The last National Hurricane Center Advisory on August 26 was issued at 11:00 pm edt.  Katrina made landfall at 6:10 am cdt on August 29, fifty-six hours later.  U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Katrina Advisory # 15 (Miami, Florida, August 26, 2005).

37 State of Louisiana, Executive Department, Proclamation No. 48 KBB 2005: State of Emergency—Hurricane Katrina (Baton Rouge,  August 26, 2005); State of Alabama, Office of the Governor, State of Emergency Proclamation (Jackson, August 26, 2005).

38 Brent Warr, Mayor of Gulfport, Mississippi, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Mississippi, on December 7, 2005, submitted to the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session.

39 Department of Homeland Security SITREP #4, August 27, 2005.  See generally, Robert R. Latham Jr., Executive Director of the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Mississippi, on December 7, 2005, submitted to the House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session.

40 Louisiana State Police, “LSP Timeline of Events,” n.d., ca. 2005, 2.

41 Louisiana National Guard, Task Force Pelican, “Hurricane Katrina Overview of Significant Events,” November 28, 2005, 4.

42 State of Alabama, Office of the Governor, Executive Order No. 939 (Jackson, August 26, 2005).

43 U.S. Department of Defense, “Mississippi Guard Provide Relief to State,” Armed Forces Press Service, September 8, 2005, .

44 “More than 8,000 people perished September 8, 1900 when the category 4 hurricane barreled into Galveston…,”  U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “The Galveston Storm of 1900 - The Deadliest Disaster in History,” .  See also Erik Larson, Isaac’s Storm: A Man, a Time, and the Deadliest Hurricane in History (New York: Random House, 1999), 264-265.  Note that statistics for disasters can vary significantly depending on the source consulted, due to both variances in how terms are defined and the difficulty of confirming specific data in the aftermath of a devastating event.

45 The Saffir-Simpson scale for measuring hurricane strength had not been developed until 1969—four years after Hurricane Betsy made landfall on the Louisiana coast.  The classification of Hurricane Betsy as a Category 3 storm was made retroactively based on wind speed readings.  For general information on Hurricane Betsy, see U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, “Historical Records of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ Response to Recent Hurricanes,” .  For deaths, see Eric S. Blake et al., The Deadliest, Costliest, and Most Intense United States Tropical Cyclones from 1851 to 2004 (And Other Frequently Requested Hurricane Facts), NOAA Technical Memorandum NWS TPC-4 (Miami, Florida, August 2005), 7, ; compare to U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, “How Safe is New Orleans from Flooding?” September 11, 2003,  (reporting 81 deaths).  For extent of flooding by parish see, Joseph A. Towers, former Attorney for the Army Corps of Engineers, testimony before the Task Force on Updating the National Environmental Policy Act, Congressional Resources Committee, 109th Congress, 1st session, 2005, .

46 “Damaged homes” include those with major damage, but not those with minor damage.  For deaths, see Ernest Zebrowski and Judith A. Howard, Category 5:  The Story of Camille (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2005); For homes damaged or destroyed, see Roger A. Pielke, Jr., Chantal Simonpietri, and Jennifer Oxelson, Thirty Years After Hurricane Camille:  Lessons Learned, Lessons Lost (Boulder, Colorado, July 1999).  For other information, see U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Hurricane Center, “Hurricane History – Hurricane Camille, 1969,” .

47 See Greg Brouwer “The Creeping Storm,” Civil Engineering Magazine, June, 2003, .  See also U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, “Morganza to the Gulf of Mexico Hurricane Protection Project,” .  It is important to note that the levees protecting New Orleans were designed in advance of the Saffir-Simpson model.  Although it is often reported that New Orleans levees were constructed to protect against a Category 3 storm, the levee system was actually designed to withstand a Standard Project Hurricane (SPH)—a theoretical hybrid of many different storms.  The central pressure for an SPH is in the Category 4 range, the highest wind speed is that of a high strength Category 2, and the surge is similar to that of a Category 3.  Al Naomi (Senior Project Manager, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers), “Talkback,” Riverside (a publication of the U.S. Army Corps of  Engineers), January, 2005, 8, .

48 In 1999, the Senate of the State of Louisiana issued a resolution “to authorize and to urge the governor of … Louisiana to support the development of the ‘Comprehensive Hurricane Protection Plan for Coastal Louisiana’ by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to provide continuous hurricane protection from Morgan City to the Mississippi border.”  Senate of the State of Louisiana, House Concurrent Resolution No. 142 (Baton Rouge, June 18, 1999).  The Comprehensive Hurricane Protection Plan for Coastal Louisiana by the New Orleans District U.S. Army Corps of Engineers was released in June 2000.  U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Comprehensive Hurricane Protection Plan for Coastal Louisiana (New Orleans, June 2000).

49 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Comprehensive Hurricane Protection Plan for Coastal Louisiana (New Orleans, June 2000).

50 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service, Southern Region headquarters, “Tropical Cyclone Hazards: Inland Flooding,” July 27, 2004, : “It is common to think the stronger the storm the greater the potential for flooding.  However, this is not always the case.  A weak, slow moving tropical storm can cause more damage due to flooding than a more powerful fast moving hurricane.” See also, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Comprehensive Hurricane Protection Plan for Coastal Louisiana ( New Orleans, June 2000).

51 Statement  of Vice Admiral Conrad C. Lautenbacher, Jr (Undersecretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere.), before 31st AMS Broadcasters Conference 200-300 Broadcast Meteorologists/Private Sector and Industry, June 26, 2002,  

52 The origins of the Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Planning Project can be traced back to 1998 when, in the wake of Hurricane Georges, the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness recognized the need for more comprehensive hurricane planning.  After an initial period of development, the State of Louisiana submitted planning proposals to FEMA for approval.  FEMA granted the State funding in 2001, but was forced to withdraw those funds a year later, due to budgetary constraints.  Despite this setback, the need for catastrophic hurricane planning in Louisiana continued to be recognized at both the Federal and State level.  On March 17, 2004, FEMA awarded funding to the State of Louisiana for what would become the Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Planning Project.  See Sean E. Fontenot, Former Chief, Planning Division, Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, written statement submitted for a hearing on Preparing for Catastrophe: The Hurricane Pam Exercise, on January 24, 2006, before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Congress, 2nd session, 10.

53 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Hurricane PAM Exercise Concludes,” July 23, 2004.  The Hurricane PAM exercise included participants from thirteen southeast Louisiana Parishes: Ascension, Assumption, Jefferson, Lafourche, Orleans, Plaquemines, St. Bernard, St. Charles, St. James, St. John, St. Tammany, Tangipahoa, and Terrebonne.  See also Senator Susan Collins (R-Maine), statement at a hearing on Preparing for a Catastrophe: The Hurricane Pam Exercise, on January 24, 2006, to the Senate Committee Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Congress, 2nd session.

54 Wayne Fairley, Chief, Response Operation Branch, Response and Recovery Division, FEMA Region IV, written statement submitted for a hearing on Preparing for Catastrophe: The Hurricane Pam Exercise, on January 24, 2006, before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Congress, 2nd session, 9.

55 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Response Coordination Center, video teleconference, August 27, 2005.

56 Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Katrina Advisory # 15A (Washington, D.C., August 27, 2005); Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Katrina Advisory # 19 (Washington, D.C., August 27, 2005).  As noted previously, times are referenced in accordance with the time zone—Eastern Daylight Time or Central Daylight Time—listed on the source material supporting the text.

57 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service Tropical Prediction Center and National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Katrina Advisory # 19 (Miami, Florida, August 27, 2005).

58 NHC’s Bill Reeve warned that the storm was headed toward “the worst possible locations for storm surge” and would produce a surge typical of a Category 4 or Category 5 hurricane.  See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Response Coordination Center, video teleconference, August 27, 2005.

59 Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel Brown, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Katrina: August 23-30, 2005, prepared for the National Hurricane Center, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (Miami, Florida, December 2005).  See also U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service Tropical Prediction Center and National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Katrina Intermediate Advisory # 18A, (Miami, Florida, August 27, 2005).

60 Louisiana Office of the Governor, Response to U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Information Request Dated October 7, 2005 (Baton Rouge, December 2005),  4. State Representative Cedric Richmond called Governor Blanco on Saturday afternoon after visiting a ballpark where hundreds were in attendance.  Representative Richmond “learned that some people had not paid attention to the weekend news and did not realize the severity of the hurricane aiming at New Orleans.  He worries that many may have thought that the hurricane was still targeting the Florida panhandle….

61 Louisiana Office of the Governor, Response to U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Information Request Dated October 7, 2005 (Baton Rouge, December 2005), 4.

62 Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development, “Timeline for Hurricane Katrina,” n.d., ca. 2005, 2.

63 In Phase I or the Precautionary Phase, “The Plan prescribes that during the Precautionary phase, the location of staging areas for people who need transportation will be announced and that public transportation will concentrate on moving people from the staging areas to safety in host parishes with priority given to people with special needs.  Furthermore, during the Precautionary stage the Plan directs that nursing homes and other custodial care organizations in the risk areas should be contacted to ensure that they are prepared to evacuate their residents.”  Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, “Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Evacuation and Sheltering Plan,” in State of Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan Supplement 1A (Baton Rouge, January 2000); Louisiana State Police, “LSP Timeline of Events,” n.d., ca. 2005, 2.  On Saturday August 27, 2005, representatives of the Louisiana Nursing Home Association (LNHA), sitting at the Louisiana State EOC, started calling and emailing all the at-risk nursing homes in Louisiana, checking on their preparedness for the storm and determining if they were planning to evacuate or shelter-in-place.  They were able to reach most of the nursing homes. They learned that the State EOP was also calling nursing homes, as were the local parish sheriffs.  By Sunday morning, some nursing homes that intended to shelter-in-place had decided to evacuate.  They had previously been told that buses were available but, by the time they decided to evacuate, drivers were not available.  At that point the LNHA made formal requests for bus drivers, but none materialized prior to landfall.  In all, prior to the storm, twenty-one nursing homes evacuated and sixty-eight sheltered-in-place.  See generally, Joseph A. Donchess, Executive Director of the Louisiana Nursing Home Association, written statement for a hearing on Challenges in a Catastrophe:  Evacuating New Orleans in Advance of Hurricane Katrina, on January 31, 2006, submitted to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Congress, 2nd session.

64 Mississippi State officials estimated that approximately 400,000 people used U.S. 49 and Interstates 55 and 59 to evacuate during the 2004 hurricane season.

65 The TCC received traffic reports from Louisiana State Police troops, LA DOTD traffic counters, and other sources.  Louisiana State Police, “LSP Timeline of Events,” n.d., ca. 2005, 2-4.

66 Louisiana State Police, “LSP Timeline of Events,” n.d., ca. 2005, 4; State of Mississippi, Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, “Highway Evacuation Advisory,” news release, August 27, 2005.

67 According to Robert Latham Jr., Executive Director of MEMA, “During the 2004 hurricane season, culminating with Hurricane Ivan on September 13, 2004, the contra-flow plan was never executed, but major congestion in and around Hattiesburg, Mississippi resulted in a comprehensive review of our evacuation plan . . .  As a result of these problems, Governor Barbour asked Mississippi Public Safety Commissioner George Phillips to develop a plan that would provide additional law enforcement officers to support evacuations, especially in the Hattiesburg area.  This plan was completed prior to this year’s hurricane season and executed flawlessly for the evacuation, including execution of contra-flowing both Interstates 55 and 59 from Louisiana to Mississippi.”  Robert R. Latham Jr., Executive Director of the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Mississippi, on December 7, 2005, submitted to the House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session; Louisiana Office of the Governor, Response to U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Information Request Dated October 7, 2005 (Baton Rouge, December 2005).

68 City of New Orleans, Office of Emergency Preparedness, Hurricanes Annex--Part Three: Sheltering (New Orleans, n.d.).

69 Erin Fowler of the Department of Health and Human Services Regional Emergency Coordination Program Office spoke with Dr. Roseanne Pratts, Director of Emergency Preparedness for the Louisiana Department of Health, on August 27, “and inquired if federal HHS assistance was needed for patient movement or evacuation, or anything else.  Dr. Pratts  responded no, that they do not require anything at this time, and they would be in touch if and when they needed assistance.”  Senators Susan Collins and Joseph Lieberman, statements during a hearing on Challenges in a Catastrophe:  Evacuating New Orleans in Advance of Hurricane Katrina, on January 31, 2006, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Congress, 2nd session.  HHS also offered assistance to New Orleans health officials on August 27, 2005.    See generally, Joseph A. Donchess, Executive Director of the Louisiana Nursing Home Association, written statement for a hearing on Challenges in a Catastrophe:  Evacuating New Orleans in Advance of Hurricane Katrina, on January 31, 2006, submitted to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Congress, 2nd session.

70 Louisiana Office of the Governor, Response to U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Information Request Dated October 7, 2005 (Baton Rouge, December 2005).

71 Liability concerns may have constrained the development of this program.  Nicholas Riccardi and James Rainey, “Katrina’s Aftermath,” Los Angeles Times, September 13, 2005 ; Bruce Nolan, “In Storm, N.O. Wants No One Left Behind,” The Times-Picayune, July 24, 2005.

72 Louisiana Office of the Governor, Response to U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Information Request Dated October 7, 2005 (Baton Rouge, December 2005).

73 For the notice on recommended evacuations of Algiers, the Lower Ninth Ward, and low-lying areas, see City of New Orleans, “Mayor Nagin Urges Citizens to Prepare for Hurricane Katrina,” news release, August 27, 2005.  The Louisiana evacuation plan called for New Orleans to begin evacuations thirty hours prior to projected landfall.  This delay was designed to enable residents of coastal areas to evacuate, see Mayor’s Office of Communications, City of New Orleans, “Mayor Nagin Urges Citizens to Prepare for Hurricane Katrina,” news release, August 27, 2005; “Mayor Urges Storm Preparations,” NOLA.com: Times Picayune Breaking News Weblog, August 27, 2005

74 Bruce Nolan, “Katrina Takes Aim,” The New Orleans Times-Picayune, August 28, 2005: “New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin followed at 5:00 pm, issuing a voluntary evacuation.”

75 City of New Orleans, Mayor’s Office of Communications, “Mayor Nagin Urges Citizens to Prepare for Hurricane Katrina,” news release, August 27, 2005.

76 State of Mississippi, Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, “Evacuation Traffic Expected to Increase on Interstates, ” news release, August 27, 2005; U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Hurricane Center, “Hurricane Katrina Forecast Timeline,” n.d., ca. 2005.  See also U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Response Coordination Center, video teleconference, August 27, 2005, (Mississippi EOC reporting voluntary evacuations being encouraged along coastal counties).

77 In an interview with Frontline, New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin described the difficulty completing a mandatory evacuation: “But keep in mind the last time a hurricane event happened is 1965.  Most people ride out these storms—they’re Category 2s or whatever, and it’s no big deal.  The storm before Katrina a couple of weeks earlier—another Parish official made this huge declaration to mandatorily evacuate in spite of what everyone else was saying.  So public confidence was a little low at the time . . . I think regardless of what we do in this town, some people will stay.”  Ray Nagin, Mayor of New Orleans, interview by Public Broadcasting Service, Frontline, November 22, 2005.

78 Louisiana Office of the Governor, Response to U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Information Request Dated October 7, 2005 (Baton Rouge, December 2005).

79 American Red Cross, “Gulf Coast States Prepare for Hurricane Katrina,” news release, August 27, 2005,  

80 State of Mississippi, Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, “Evacuation Traffic Expected to Increase on Interstates,” news release, August 27, 2005.

81 Louisiana Office of Emergency Preparedness, “Situation Report Executive Summary: Hurricane Katrina,”August 27, 2005.

82 The declaration of the Superdome as a “special needs shelter” was an element of the State’s Emergency Operations Plan.  According to the plan, the Superdome serves as the Category II special needs shelter for Jefferson, Plaquemines, Orleans, and St. Bernard parishes.  “Category II” facilities are for patients whose conditions are “less serious and less likely to undergo a severe deterioration.”  State of Louisiana, Emergency Operations Plan, Supplement 1C: Louisiana Shelter Operations Plan (Baton Rouge, April 2005), Annex X “Special Needs Plan,” 5, 10, Appendix 2.  The Superdome had also been used as “a shelter of last resort” in previous hurricanes.  The Superdome was first used in this capacity in 1998 when people sought refuge from Hurricane Georges.  U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service Forecast Office, “Top Weather Events of the 20th Century within the NWSFO New Orleans/Baton Rouge Service Area,” December 8, 2005, .  The State of Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan defines a shelter of last resort as “a place for persons to be protected from the high winds and heavy rains from the storm. Unlike a shelter, there may be little or no water or food and possibly no utilities. A Last Resort Refuge is intended to provide best available survival protection for the duration of the hurricane only.” Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, State of Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan: Supplement 1A  (Baton Rouge, January 2000), 29.

83 City of New Orleans, “Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan: Special Needs Shelter Plan,” .  The Plan states: “ I t is not appropriate to admit individuals to this shelter who require constant care or who require constant electricity to support machines necessary to maintain their life.  Dialysis will not be available.  Persons who are acutely ill will be evaluated and referred to local hospitals for definitive care.  On a daily basis, every person with a chronic medical problem should have a viable plan that has been discussed with their primary physician so that when a disaster occurs, they will have an action plan established which can be put into effect.”

84 State of Texas, Texas State Operations Center, “Situation Report #8,” August 27, 2005.

85 State of Mississippi, Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, “Mississippi to Reverse Lane Interstates 55 and 59,” news release, August 27, 2005.

86 Robert R. Latham Jr., Executive Director of the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Mississippi, on December 7, 2005, submitted to the House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session.

87 Louisiana National Guard, Task Force Pelican, “Hurricane Katrina Overview of Significant Events,” November 28, 2005, 5.

88 State of Alabama, Office of the Governor, “Governor Riley Says Supplies Ready to Assist Hurricane Victims,” news release, August 28, 2005: “Alabama has pre-positioned supplies . . .  Governor Riley said the state already has 290,000 bags of ice, more than 250,000 gallons of water, 652,000 MREs (meals ready to eat), and 110,000 tarps measuring 20 feet by 25 feet.”

89 Office of the Governor of Alabama, “Governor Riley Briefed on State’s Hurricane Preparations,” news release,  August 27, 2005; State of Alabama, Office of the Governor, “Governor Riley Says Supplies Ready to Assist Hurricane Victims,” news release, August 28, 2005.

90 State of Texas, State Operations Center, “Situation Report #8,” August 27, 2005.

91 Level 1 operations began at 7:00 am edt.  U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP # 4,” August 27, 2005, 11.

92 Hurricane Katrina DHS Situation Report #4, 27 Aug 05, 1800 hrs.

93 See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Response Coordination Center, video teleconference, August 27, 2005, 16.

94 See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Response Coordination Center, video teleconference, August 27, 2005, 16 – 17.

95 See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Response Coordination Center, video teleconference, August 27, 2005, 16-18.  The figures for liters of water, pounds of ice, and number of MREs and tarps were converted using FEMA conversion factors of 18,000 liters of water, 40,000 pounds of ice, 2,520 tarps, and 21,888 MREs per truckload.  FEMA Office of Legislative Affairs, Hurricane Katrina Response Fact Sheet.

96 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP # 4,” August 27, 2005.

97 See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Response Coordination Center, video teleconference, August 27, 2005, 22.

98 Colonel Jeff Smith, Acting Deputy Director, Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, testimony at hearing on the Hurricane Katrina Response in Louisiana, on December 14, 2005, before the House Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 2nd session.  See also transcript of August 27, 2005, NRCC Video Teleconference.  The Emergency Response Team-National is a national “on-call” team that is ready to deploy to large disasters such as Category 3 or 4 hurricanes.  See also, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP # 4,” August 27, 2005.  For definition of ERT-N, see  U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency.  See also FEMA National Situation Update, August 28, 2005, . “Glossary,” .

99 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, DC, December 2004), 40.   See also Dan Bement, “FEMA Operations,” prepared for the U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, .

100 U.S. Department of Defense, “Hurricane Katrina Timeline,” August 29, 2005.

101 U.S. Department of Defense, “Hurricane Katrina Timeline,” August 29, 2005.

102 See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #4,” August 27, 2005.

103 The emergency declaration for Mississippi was requested by Governor Barbour on Saturday, August, 27, 2005; the emergency declaration for Alabama was requested by Governor Riley on Sunday, August 28, 2005.  Presidential states of emergency were declared for both States on August 28.  70 Fed. Reg. 53239 (Aug. 28, 2005) (Mississippi); 70 Fed. Reg. 54061-62 (Aug. 28, 2005) (Alabama).

104 President Bush authorized FEMA “. . . to identify, mobilize, and provide at its discretion, equipment and resources necessary to alleviate the impacts of the emergency” for the parishes of Allen, Avoyelles, Beauregard, Bienville, Bossier, Caddo, Caldwell, Claiborne, Catahoula, Concordia, De Soto, East Baton Rouge, East Carroll, East Feliciana, Evangeline, Franklin, Grant, Jackson, LaSalle, Lincoln, Livingston, Madison, Morehouse, Natchitoches, Pointe Coupee, Ouachita, Rapides, Red River, Richland, Sabine, St. Helena, St. Landry, Tensas, Union, Vernon, Webster, West Carroll, West Feliciana, and Winn.  The White House,“Statement on Emergency Assistance for Louisiana,” news release, August 27, 2005.  See also, Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Public Law 93-288, as amended “Stafford Act” , § 502(a)(b).

105 Data on pre-landfall disaster declarations compiled from: Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Federally Declared Disasters by Calendar Year,” Library, .  Hurricane Floyd did not make landfall until 6:30 am on September 16, 1999, but the storm caused significant coastal damage as it passed offshore Florida, Georgia, and the Carolinas; as a result, President Clinton issued emergency declarations for Florida and Georgia on September 14.  He did the same for the Carolinas the following day.  For more information, see: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Emergency Aid Ordered For Florida Hurricane Response,” news release, September 14, 1999, ; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Emergency Aid Ordered For Georgia Hurricane Response,” news release, September 14, 1999, ; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency,“Emergency Aid Ordered For South Carolina Hurricane Response,” news release, September 15, 1999,  and U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Emergency Aid Ordered For North Carolina Hurricane Response,” news release, September 15, 1999, .

106 On August 27, 2005, Governor Kathleen  Blanco sent a letter to President Bush requesting an emergency declaration for the State of Louisiana.  The letter stated, “I have determined that this incident is of such severity and magnitude that effective response is beyond the capabilities of the State and affected local governments, and that supplementary Federal assistance is necessary to save lives, protect property, public health, and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a disaster.”  The letter contained a list of “State and local resources that have been or will be used to alleviate the conditions of this emergency.”  It also certified that “the State and local governments will assume all applicable non-Federal share of costs required by the Stafford Act.”  Governor Blanco specifically requested “emergency protective measures, direct Federal Assistance, Individual and Household Program (IHP) assistance, Special Needs Program assistance, and debris removal” for all affected areas.  She defined the affected areas as “all the southeastern parishes including the New Orleans Metropolitan area and the mid-state Interstate I-49 corridor and northern parishes along the I-20 corridor that are accepting the thousands of citizens evacuating  . . . . ,”  Kathleen  Blanco, Governor of Louisiana, Letter to President Bush requesting that he declare an emergency for the State of Louisiana due to Hurricane Katrina (Baton Rouge, August 27, 2005).  That same day President Bush declared a state of emergency in Louisiana. 70 Fed. Reg. 53238 (August 27, 2005).

107 William Lokey, Federal Coordinating Officer for Baton Rouge, written statement for a hearing on Louisiana Hurricane Katrina Response and Recovery, on December 14, 2005, submitted to the House Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st  session.

108 Louisiana Office of the Governor, Response to U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Information Request Dated October 7, 2005 (Baton Rouge, December 2005);  U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Hurricane Center, “Hurricane Katrina Forecast Timeline,” n.d., ca. 2005.

109 Max Mayfield, testimony before a hearing on “The Lifesaving Role of Accurate Hurricane Prediction, ”Disaster Prevention and Prediction Hearing, U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, on September 20, 2005, 109th Congress, 1st session, 11.  Mayfield said: “Yes Sir, I called. I don’t do that very often.  But I—in fact, I have only done that only one other time for Hurricane Lili in the— when it was a Category 4 Hurricane in the Gulf of Mexico.  I called the former Governor of Louisiana in 2002.  And this was Saturday night around 8:30 or 9 o’clock eastern time and I called the—I got hold of the Governor of Louisiana, the Governor of Mississippi and Governor Blanco in Louisiana suggested I call Mayor Nagin in New Orleans.  I called him and left a message and he called me right back and I have—a lot of people have asked me what I said and I,  you know, with the hundreds of briefings that we did, I don’t remember exactly. But the whole purpose of that was just to be absolutely sure that they understood the severity of the situation and I do remember telling all three of them that I want to leave the National Hurricane Center that night and be able to go home and sleep knowing that I had done everything that I could do.”

110 Max Mayfield, testimony before a hearing on “The Lifesaving Role of Accurate Hurricane Prediction,” Disaster Prevention and Prediction, U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, on September 20, 2005, 109th Congress, 1st session, 11.

111 See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Response Coordination Center, video teleconference, August 27, 2005.

112 Brigadier General David L. Johnson, Director, National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service, testimony before a hearing on “Predicting Hurricanes:  What We Knew About Katrina, ”U.S. House Select Committee on Hurricane Katrina, on September 22, 2005, 109th Congress, 1st session, 43 (testifying that Hurricane Katrina became a Category 4 storm at 12:40 am on Sunday, August 28, and became a Category 5 storm at 6:15 am that same day).

113 Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel Brown, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Katrina: August 23-30, 2005, National Hurricane Center, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (Miami, Florida, December 2005), 3.

114 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service, New Orleans/Baton Rouge Forecast Office, Slidell, Louisiana, “Urgent Weather Message,”August 28, 2005.

115 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Katrina Advisory # 25, (Miami, Florida, August 28, 2005).

116 U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service, New Orleans/Baton Rouge Forecast Office, Slidell, LA, “Urgent Weather Message,” August 28, 2005.

117 The Emergency Alert System (EAS) is a mechanism for public officials—Federal, State, and local—to communicate disaster information and instructions rapidly and widely.  The system aims to reach the broadest possible audience by disseminating emergency updates on existing radio and television stations, including via digital and satellite networks.  Federal Communications Commission, FCC Consumer Facts: The Emergency Alert System (Washington, DC, 2005), 1.  See also State of California, “What Is EAS?,” .  The new EAS system is the direct descendent of the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS), the Nation’s alert system from 1963 until the advent of EAS.  EAS was officially launched on January 1, 1997 (for radio stations) and December 31, 1998 (for television).  Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Background on the Emergency Alert System,” October 23, 2004, .  While EAS fulfills the same function as EBS, it differs in that it takes advantage of digital technology to permit automation of transmission.  Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Background on the Emergency Alert System,” October 23, 2004, .  The Emergency Broadcast System and its EAS successor were originally designed for the President to speak to the Nation during an emergency, particularly following catastrophic nuclear attacks.  But the system was made available to State and local officials in 1963, and since then has been used primarily for weather emergencies.  “There are two contexts in which the EAS will be used—Presidentially-initiated alerts and messages and those initiated by State and local governments in concert with the broadcast industry.”  Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Background on the Emergency Alert System,” October 23, 2004, .  See also, Federal Communications Commission, FCC Consumer Facts: The Emergency Alert System (Washington, DC, 2005), 2.  The document states: “a state emergency manager may use the system to send out a public warning by broadcasting that warning from one or more major radio stations in a particular state.”  EAS was not activated prior to landfall aside from NOAA hurricane warnings and advisories.  “The Emergency Alert System was never activated by the White House or by State or local governments during Katrina.”  Ken Kerschbaumer, “Broadcasters Seek Better Emergency Alert System,” Broadcasting and Cable, September 12, 2005.

118 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service, “NOAA Weather Radio All Hazards,” January 31, 2006, .  The Federal Communication Commission’s EAS Primary Entry Point (PEP) station in New Orleans (station WWL) was one of the few radio stations in the area to provide continuous service to the New Orleans area.  The NOAA Weather Radio (NWR) is a national network of radio stations that continuously broadcast weather and hazard information from local Weather Service offices.  Operating in close conjunction with EAS, NOAA Weather Radio comprises an “all hazards” radio network that acts as a “single source for comprehensive weather and emergency information.”  National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service, “NOAA Weather Radio All Hazards,” January 31, 2006, .

119 Transcript of August 27, 2005, NRCC Video Teleconference.

120 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Coast Guard, Hurricane Katrina: The U.S. Coast Guard at its Best (Washington, D.C., 2005), 15.

121 “New Orleans Mayor, Louisiana Governor Hold Press Conference,” CNN, August 28, 2005, .

122 “New Orleans Mayor, Louisiana Governor Hold Press Conference,” CNN, August 28, 2005,  .  Louisiana law provides the parish presidents with the authority to issue mandatory evacuation orders.  The law allows the Parish President to “Direct and compel the evacuation of all or part of the population from any stricken or threatened area within the boundaries of the parish if he deems this action necessary for mitigation, response, or recovery measures.”  The law declares the penalty for violating such an order to be a fine not more than five hundred dollars, or confinement in the parish jail for not more than six months, or both.  Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act,  La. Rev. Stat. 29-727.  Although a State responsibility, it is unclear how the State or Parish law enforcement authorities intended to enforce this order.  The Mayor ordered a mandatory evacuation for the entire Parish of Orleans, with the exceptions of essential personnel of the Federal government, State of Louisiana and City of New Orleans, as well as essential personnel of regulated utilities and mass transportation services, hospitals and their patients, essential media, Orleans Parish Criminal Sheriff's office and its inmates, and the essential personnel of operating hotels and their patrons.  The Mayor ordered every person not exempt to immediately evacuate the City of New Orleans, or if no other alternative was available, to immediately move to one of the facilities within the City that would be designated a refuge of last resort.

123 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Coordination Center, video teleconference, August 28, 2005.

124 Frances Fragos Townsend, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, remarks to the National Emergency Management Association’s 2006 mid-year conference, February 13, 2006.

125 See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Coordination Center, video teleconference, August 28, 2005.

126 See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Coordination Center, video teleconference, August 28, 2005.

127 Secretary Chertoff asked, “…are there any DOD assets that might be available.  Have we reached out to them, and have we I guess made any kind of arrangement in case we need some additional help from them?”  Director Brown responded, “We have DOD assets over here at the EOC.   They are fully engaged, and we are having those discussions with them now.”  U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Response Coordination Center, video teleconference, August 28, 2005.

128 Michael Chertoff, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, testimony on the Department of Homeland Security Relief Response, on October 19, 2005, before the House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress 1st session, 48.  Secretary Chertoff testified, “it is correct that under the declaration there's an FCO appointed.  It was Lokey in Louisiana and Carwile in Mississippi. But Brown went down as their supervisor with direct authority over them to be on the ground in charge of the entire Gulf Coast response.  In other words, he went down on Sunday.  He was—on Saturday he was in FEMA in Washington running the operation with each of the support function representatives, including DOD literally sitting at the table with him at FEMA headquarters.  He then moved himself—after the Sunday VTC, down to Baton Rouge and operated using his authority over the FCOs as the head of the whole agency. He was in charge of this thing on the ground from his arrival on Sunday through the end.  The designation as a PFO, I guess, was a kind of formal recognition of that.”

129 Michael Chertoff, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, written statement for a hearing on the Department of Homeland Security’s Hurricane Relief Response, on October 19, 2005, submitted to the House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session, 14.

130 The White House, “President Discusses Hurricane Katrina, Congratulates Iraqis on Draft Constitution,” news release, August 28, 2005.

131 By Sunday afternoon, Mississippi ordered mandatory or voluntary evacuation orders for six counties.  Alabama Governor Bob Riley issued evacuation orders for Mobile and Baldwin counties.  State of Mississippi, Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, “Mississippians Urged to Take Precautions for Hurricane Katrina,” news release, August 28, 2005; State of Alabama, Office of the Governor, “Governor Riley Orders Evacuation of Parts of Mobile and Baldwin Counties,” news release, August 28, 2005; Leigh Ann Ryals, Director of the Baldwin County Emergency Management Agency, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Alabama, on November 9, 2005, House Committee on Government Reform on the State of Alabama’s Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina,109th Congress, 1st session.

132 “Before Katrina came, I developed a new evacuation plan that includes contra-flow, where both sides of the interstates are used for outbound traffic. I am proud that we rapidly moved over 1.2 million people - some 92% of the population - to safety without gridlock or undue delay prior to Katrina.”  Governor Kathleen  Blanco,  written statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Louisiana, on December 14, 2005, submitted to the U.S. House Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session.  See also, Johnny Bradberry, Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development, testimony before a hearing on the Evacuation of New Orleans, Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, January 31, 2006, 109th Congress, 2nd session.

133 U.S. Department of Transportation, “Hurricane Katrina - Situation Report Five,” August 29, 2005; Louis Armstrong New Orleans International Airport, “Hurricane Katrina from the Airport’s Point of View,” .

134 Governor Kathleen  Blanco, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Louisiana, on December 14, 2005, submitted to the U.S. House Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session.  The Louisiana DOTD estimated that 500,000 vehicles evacuated during Phase 3 operations, see Louisiana State Police, “LSP Timeline of Events,” n.d., ca. 2005, 5.

135 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #6,” August 29, 2005, 12.

136 State of Texas, State Operations Center, “Situation Report #9,” August 28, 2005.

137 Ray Nagin, Mayor of New Orleans, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Louisiana, on December 14, 2005, U.S. House Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session, “After a Sunday morning statewide conference call, I announced the first ever in our almost 300-year history a citywide mandatory evacuation order, which followed the evacuation orders, I might add, of some of the other low-lying parishes that also were encouraging their citizens to evacuate post haste.  We opened the Superdome as our refuge of last resort, and we staged buses throughout the city to transport people to the Superdome, and set a curfew for dusk. The city also evacuated 400 special needs residents to the state shelter and then opened the Superdome at 8 a.m. that morning for the remaining special needs populations.  There were thousands of residents that did not leave, including those with means who would choose to ride out the storm like their parents had done during Hurricane Betsy. When reality set in for many of them on Sunday, they made their way to the refuge of last resort, the Superdome.”

Louisiana National Guard personnel on-scene reported no evacuees at the Superdome until after noon. Louisiana National Guard, Task Force Pelican, “Hurricane Katrina Overview of Significant Events,” November 28, 2005, 5-6.

138 Major General Bennett Landreneau, Louisiana National Guard, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the Department of Defense, the Coast Guard, and the National Guard of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, on October 27, 2005, House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session.  A shelter of last resort is intended to serve only as a location to ride out the winds of a storm.  Under the State of Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan, it could “be located either inside or outside of the Hurricane Risk” and did not have to meet American Red Cross shelter standards.  It is required to be “wind resistant” and “located outside of the flood zone or provide the  ability to locate on floors.”  Louisiana Office of Emergency Preparedness, State of Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan Supplement 1C: Louisiana Shelter Operations Plan (Baton Rouge, as revised July 2000), Annex M.

139 Marty Bahamonde, Regional Director for External Affairs, Region One, FEMA, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, A Flooded City, A Chaotic Response, on October 20, 2005, submitted to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong., 1st session, 2, stating, “Later that night after most of the 12,000 evacuees entered the Superdome, I returned to the EOC around midnight to ride out the storm.”  Although estimates put the Superdome population at between 20,000 and 40,000 by Friday, September 2, when evacuations of the Superdome began, Louisiana officials have stated that this increase took place after landfall on the Gulf Coast.  Colonel Jeff Smith, Acting Deputy Director, Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, testimony before a hearing on the Hurricane Katrina Response in Louisiana, on December 14, 2005, House Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 2nd session.  Jeff Smith had recently taken the job of Acting Deputy Director of the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness.  On November 29, 2004, a Federal grand jury had indicted Michael L. Brown, the former Deputy Director of the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP) and the State official responsible for overall management of Louisiana's Hazardous Mitigation Grants from FEMA, on charges of obstructing a Federal audit.  This grant program funds mitigation projects to prevent flood loses or flood claims made upon the National Flood Insurance Program.  Two other LOHSEP officials were indicted with him.  U.S. Department of Justice, Three State Officials Indicted for Obstructing Federal Audit, press release, November 29, 2004, ; Ken Silverstein and Josh Meyer, "Katrina's Aftermath: Louisiana Officials Indicted Before Katrina Hit," Los Angeles Times, September 17, 2005, 17.

140 For example, the State of Alabama made a request on August 28 for shuttle trucks and tarps to be delivered to Maxwell Air Force Base.  Alabama also requested the transport and delivery of two 50-man Joint Field Office kits to Montgomery.  Mississippi requested the pre-positioning of 30 trucks of water with tractors at Meridian NAS and two helicopters to transport response personnel.

141 FEMA Office of Legislative Affairs, Hurricane Katrina Response Fact Sheet.

142 Speaking before the House Ways and Means Committee, Joseph C. Becker, Senior Vice President, American Red Cross, stated “It has been the policy of the Red Cross that there are no safe areas south of the I-10/I-12 corridor for a large-scale hurricane . . .  We do not establish shelters in facilities that do not meet our criteria for safety during landfall.”  In saying this, Mr. Becker clearly implies that the Superdome is considered by the Red Cross to be an “unsafe” shelter.  See Joseph C. Becker, Senior Vice President of Preparedness and Response, American Red Cross, written statement for a hearing on the Response of Charities to Hurricane Katrina, on December 13, 2005, before the House Ways and Means Committee, 109th Congress 1st session.  However, the Red Cross was not against the use of the Superdome as a shelter of last resort.  In a “frequently asked questions” portion of the official Red Cross website the organization states, “the original plan was to evacuate all the residents of New Orleans to safe places outside the city.  With the hurricane bearing down, the city government decided to open a shelter of last resort in the Superdome downtown.  We applaud this decision and believe it saved a significant number of lives.” See American Red Cross, “Frequently Asked Questions,”  (emphasis added). Thus, the Superdome, while it did not meet the Red Cross’ safety requirements, served a valuable purpose as a shelter of last resort.  Although the Red Cross’s own policies prevented it from directly staffing the Superdome, the organization claims that it was willing to supply the shelter with essential commodities after Katrina made landfall.  According to the “Frequently Asked Questions” statement on its website, the organization was prevented from carrying out this mission by the National Guard and local authorities.

143 “New Orleans Mayor, Louisiana Governor Hold Press Conference,” CNN Breaking News, August 28, 2005, .

144 Major General Bennett Landreneau, Adjutant General, State of Louisiana, testimony before a hearing on Military Disaster Relief, on October 27, 2005, House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session.

145 Louisiana National Guard, Task Force Pelican, “Hurricane Katrina Overview of Significant Events,” November 28, 2005, 3, 5.

146 Louisiana National Guard, Task Force Pelican, “Hurricane Katrina Overview of Significant Events,” November 28, 2005, 6.

147 Louisiana National Guard, Task Force Pelican, “Hurricane Katrina Overview of Significant Events,” November 28, 2005, 6.

148 Louisiana National Guard, Task Force Pelican, “Hurricane Katrina Overview of Significant Events,” November 28, 2005, 7.

149 Louisiana National Guard, Task Force Pelican, “Hurricane Katrina Overview of Significant Events,” November 28, 2005, 7.

150 Louisiana National Guard, Task Force Pelican, “Hurricane Katrina Overview of Significant Events,” November 28, 2005, 7-8.  U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) contacted the Director of Emergency Preparedness for the Louisiana Health Department.  The State declined assistance.

151 “New Orleans Mayor, Louisiana Governor Hold Press Conference,” CNN, August 28, 2005, .

152 Louisiana State Police, “LSP Timeline of Events,” n.d., ca. 2005. 5.  The storm forced Troop B of the Louisiana State Police to relocate from their barracks to the Kenner Police Department’s headquarters.

153 Parish officials declared mandatory evacuations for Lafourche, Orleans, Plaquemines, St. Bernard, St. Charles and St. John the Baptist parishes.  Officials declared mandatory evacuations for limited geographical or flood-prone areas of the following parishes: Jefferson, St. James, Livingston, Tangipahoa, St. Tammany and Terrebone.  Parish officials recommended evacuations in Ascension, Assumption and Washington parishes.  See Louisiana State Police, “Southeast Louisiana Evacuations Continue,” news release, August 28, 2005; Louisiana State Police, “Hurricane Evacuations: Livingston Parish,” news release, August 28, 2005; Louisiana State Police, “Hurricane Evacuations: St. Tammany Parish,” news release, August 28, 2005; Louisiana State Police, “Hurricane Evacuations: Washington Parish,” news release, August 28, 2005.

154 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Tropical Storm Katrina Briefing, August 25, 2005.

155 Mobile Emergency Response Support (MERS) detachments consist of trained personnel and mobile response assets.  FEMA has five MERS detachments strategically placed across the country.  MERS detachments are designed to provide communications capabilities and operational and logistical support to first responders.  Each MERS detachment has a suite of vehicle assets to provide support.  Because its diverse asserts are housed on a number of different trucks, a single MERS detachment “can concurrently support a large Disaster Field Office and multiple field operating sites within the disaster area.”  Thus, the deployment of one MERS unit is not married to a single location.  The communications component of MERS capabilities consists of Ku-band satellite, International Maritime Satellite (INMARSAT) and American Mobile Satellite Corporation (AMSC) satellite terminals, line of sight microwave transmission, and high frequency, very high frequency, and ultra high frequency radio.  MERS logistics support includes power, heating, ventilation, and cooling (HVAC), fuel, and potable  water.”  A MERS detachment can provide “generators to supply the power generation requirements of one or more facilities or locations within the disaster area,” and “heating, ventilation, and cooling requirements for a large office building.”  A MERS detachment also provides personnel experienced in facility management, acquisition support, warehouse operation, transportation management, and property accountability.”  Further, “the MERS Detachments have resources that can provide temporary office or operational space.”  The Denton, Texas MERS team operates FEMA’s Emergency Operations Vehicle (EOV), an “82 foot long expandable trailer providing office workstations and conference space for 20-25 people.”  The EOV also has kitchen, power generation, and communications facilities.  MERS detachments also have rapid response teams to provide initial support immediately following a disaster.  The Quick Reaction System (QRS) consists of “13 people with 4-wheel drive vehicles and support equipment for 72 hours that provide the initial damage assessment.”   This unit also has “an INMARSAT and AMSC satellite terminal, cellular telephones and laptop computers, VHF and HF radios, life support (water, food, batteries, etc.), and generators.”  Finally, ERTA and ERTS units are “preloaded trucks with food, water, clothing, first aid items, safety equipment, sleeping bags, hygiene items, office equipment, tools, and lumber.”  These trucks can support “100 people for 10 days.”  For a detailed assessment of MERS capabilities, see U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Response and Recovery: Mobile Operations Capability Guide for Emergency Managers and Planners, October 23, 2004, .

156 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “FEMA National Situation Update,” August 29, 2005, 3.

157 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Office of Legislative Affairs, Hurricane Katrina Response Fact Sheet.

158 National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Goddard Space Flight Center,  “Hurricane Katrina from TRMM: August 28, 2005,”  (data from NASA spacecraft).

159 “New Orleans Mayor, Louisiana Governor Hold Press Conference,” CNN, August 28, 2005, .

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